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Accounting for Discourse Relations:
Constituency and Dependency
Bonnie Webber
At the start of my career, I had the good fortune of working with
Ron Kaplan on Bill Woods’ Lunar system (Woods et al., 1972). One
day, in talking with Ron, I marvelled to him over the range of syntac-
tic constructions I was able to implement in Lunar’s ATN grammar
formalism. Ron replied was that you could implement anything in an
ATN: the point was, rather, to identify the minimal machinery required
for a task. This sensible advice I subsequently sought to follow, and in
this paper for Ron’s festschrift, I try to apply it to understanding and
comparing accounts of discourse relations.
1.1 Introduction
Theories of discourse that attempt to explain how the meaning of a text
is more than the sum of the meaning of its component sentences have
often been presented in ways that discourage easy comparison. One
attempt to remedy this was made by Moore and Pollack (1992), who
suggested a distinction between an intentional organization of discourse
and an informational organization. Intentional organization could be
described in terms of the speaker’s plans with respect to his/her utter-
ances and how the parts of the plan relate to each other (Grosz and
Sidner, 1990, Lochbaum, 1998), while informational organization could
be described in formal semantic and pragmatic terms, with discourse
relations such as consequence, cause, explanation, contrast, narration,
1
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etc.
While this solved part of the problem, it did not contribute to under-
standing how theories concerned with the informational organization
of discourse differ from one another. In this paper, I want to suggest
that recasting them in terms of the common linguistic concepts of con-
stituency and dependency might help us to better understand their
similarities and differences.
1.2 Constituency and Dependency
1.2.1 Constituency
In syntax, constituency has been defined in the following terms:
1. Sentences have parts, which may themselves have parts.
2. The parts of sentences belong to a limited range of types.
3. The parts have specific roles or functions within the larger parts
they belong to. (Huddleston and Pullum, 2002, 20)
Of course, different theories of syntax posit different parts, and differ-
ent parts may be appropriate for different languages. Nevertheless, it
is this idea of parts within parts that is basic to constituency, as is
the idea that parts have specific roles or functions. Both ideas are inte-
gral to the compositional interpretation of constituent structure (i.e.,
compositional semantics).
Another aspect of constituency is that parts are continuous spans. A
constituent can become discontinuous if (1) part of it moves somewhere
else — e.g., to the front of the sentence in questions (the discontinuous
PP in “Which pocket is your wallet in?”), to the rear of the sentence
when the informational content of a relative clause is more than that
of the main predicate (the discontinuous NP in “A man came in who
was wearing a green hat”); or (2) the constituent is interrupted by a
parenthetical phrase (the discontinuous VP in “I can tell you, since you
ask, more about my parents.”). But even in languages with free word
order, the parts of one constituent will not be arbitrarily scrambled
with those of others.
1.2.2 Dependency
There are several notions of dependency in linguistics. One is a syntactic
notion related to morphology, where the morphological realization of a
lexico-syntactic element depends on another element elsewhere in the
sentence or clause, including realisation as an empty element or gap.
Such a syntactic dependency may be unbounded or bounded.
In English, bounded syntactic dependencies include gender and num-
ber agreement, as in:
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(1) a. Thesei boysi shave(i) themselvesi.
b. Thisi boyi shaves(i) himselfi.
Here, i used to co-index the dependent element (simple subscript) and
the element it depends on (parenthesized subscript). The dependency
shows itself in the morphological features of the determiner, noun, verb
and reflexive pronoun.
Unbounded dependency constructions in English (Huddleston and
Pullum, 2002, 1079) contain a gap in a position that syntax requires to
be filled, as in
(2) a. This is [the book](i) whichi I think Fred said he wrote i.
b. [The other chapters](i) I think Fred said he wrote i himself.
Here
i
indicates the gap in the object position in both (2a) and (2b),
with i being the index of the element it depends on. Unbounded refers
to the arbitrary depth to which the clause containing the gap can be
embedded. Syntactically, dependency refers to the fact that the relative
pronoun in (2a) and the topicalized NP in (2b) require an associated
gap. The semantic consequences are that the gap in both examples
draws its interpretation from the constituent that it is co-indexed with
and that the topicalised NP in (2b) would be taken as being in contrast
with something else in the discourse context.
A second notion of dependency between words underlies dependency
grammar. Hudson defines this sense of dependency in terms of support :
A dependent word is supported by the word it depends on, which allows
it to occur in a sentence and also constrains such features as its pos-
sible location in a sentence and its possible morphological form.1 This
generalizes the previous notion of dependency, although it is limited to
word-to-word relations, rather than relations between lexico-syntactic
constituents, including gaps.
While both these notions of dependency are syntactic, they can also
have semantic consequences in terms of how a sentence is interpreted.
On the other hand, semantic dependency affects only interpretation
— and in particular, truth-conditional semantics. Linguistic elements
that exert such influence include quantifiers (3a), negation (3b) and
adjuncts (3c), and what they can influence includes both reference and
truth values.
(3) a. I need a student to work on every project.
b. I do not love you because you have red hair.
1http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/dick/enc/syntax.htm#dependency, The En-
cyclopedia of Dependency Grammar, accessed April 2006.
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c. A woman has been elected president for the second time.
(Huddleston and Pullum, 2002, 719)
Their range of influence is called their scope, which will be either narrow
or wide. For example, if every project is taken to have narrow scope in
(3a), the term a student will be interpreted as referring independently
of the set of projects being iterated over (meaning that one student is
needed for the whole set of projects). With wide scope, a student will
be interpreted as dependent on the set, meaning that the student that
is needed depends on the project. In (3b), it is a truth value that is
affected: if not has narrow scope, it is the proposition headed by love
that is negated (ie, because you have red hair is the reason I don’t love
you), while if it has wide scope, it is the proposition headed by because
that is negated (ie, because you have red hair is not the reason that I
do love you). Finally, in (3c), if the adjunct for the second time is taken
to have narrow scope, the referent of a woman is independent of the
election (ie, the same woman has been elected twice), while with wide
scope the referent is dependent on it (ie, a possibly different woman
has been elected each time). It should be clear that scope does not
correlate directly with relative linear order: within a clause, a scope-
bearing element can appear to the left or right of the elements it has
scope over.
The final notion of dependency is anaphoric dependency. Here, all
or part of an element’s interpretation depends on what is available in
the discourse context. For example, the interpretation of he in (4a) de-
pends on, and is coreferential with, the man introduced in the previous
sentence.2 In (4b), the interpretation of another man is dependent on
the same thing, but only in part: it is a man other than that one. In
(4c), the interpretation of one depends on set descriptions available
in the context: here, man, while in (4d), the interpretation of the el-
lipsed VP depends on available predicates. In (4e), the interpretation
of the demonstrative pronoun that depends on an abstract object (i.e., a
fact, proposition, eventuality, claim, etc. (Asher, 1993, Webber, 1991))
available from the previous discourse — here the action of ordering a
single malt. Finally, in (4f), the interpretation of the adverbial instead
depends on available predications that admit alternatives— here, refus-
ing a drink, which admits the alternative accepting one — i.e., instead
of accepting a drink, she started talking (Webber et al., 2003).
(4) a. A man walked in. He sat down.
2This notion of anaphoric dependency does not cover such intra-clausal co-
reference as “John shaves his father” and “John shaves himself”, which fit better
under the notion of (bounded) syntactic dependency.
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b. A man walked in. Another man called him over.
c. A tall man walked in, then a short one.
d. A man walked in and ordered a single malt. Then a woman
did.
e. A man walked in and ordered a single malt. That showed he
had good taste.
f. The woman refused a drink. Instead she started talking.
Only syntactic dependency is part of syntax. Semantic dependency is
part of the semantic composition process that operates alongside or on
the result of syntactic analysis, while anaphoric dependency is outwith
both syntactic analysis and semantic composition (but cf. footnote 2).
Since syntactic dependencies can impact the power of a grammar,
one on-going challenge in linguistics has been to understand whether
a given phenomenon is a matter of syntactic, semantic or anaphoric
dependency. For example, it was once thought that the relation induced
by the adverbial respectively was a matter of syntactic dependency
between elements, such as in (5a), where the two parts of the conjoined
subject are paired in order with the two parts of the conjoined verb
phrase (VP) — ie, John washing and Mary painting, and as in (5b),
where the three parts of the conjoined subject are so paired with the
three parts of the conjoined VP.
(5) a. I think that John and Mary will respectively wash his car and
paint her boat today.
b. I think John, Mary and Kim will respectively wash his car,
paint her boat, and clean their room today.
If these pairings come from the grammar, it would mean two crossing
dependencies (one crossing point) for (5a) and three crossing dependen-
cies (three crossing points) for (5b). More generally, a sentence with N
conjoined subjects, N conjoined VPs and respectively, would have N
crossing dependencies and N*(N-1)/2 crossing points. This would re-
quire a grammar to have more than context-free power.
Later, however, it was noted that negation removed the need for
such pairing:
(6) a. I think John and Mary will wash his car and paint her boat,
but probably not respectively.
b. I think John, Mary and Kim will wash his car, paint her boat,
and clean their room, but probably not respectively.
This wouldn’t happen if the dependency were syntactic or even seman-
tic. Thus, the individual dependencies associated with respectively must
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be the result of inference based on anaphoric dependency.3
In the following sections, I will use these notions of constituency and
dependency to characterize the source of discourse relations in several
theories of discourse. This will, I hope, illuminate both their similarities
and differences. However, I do not have the space here for what would
have to be an extended discussion of SDRT (Asher and Lascarides,
2003), given the deep involvement of inference in how it derives dis-
course relations.
1.3 Dependency as a Source of Discourse Relations
The theory of discourse articulated by Halliday and Hasan (1976) is one
in which discourse relations can be seen to arise solely from anaphoric
dependency. Specifically, Halliday and Hasan (1976) consider cohesion
to be what relates parts of a discourse, where cohesion is defined as
holding when one part cannot be effectively interpreted except by re-
course to the interpretation of another part. Halliday and Hasan posit
five types of cohesion, each associated with a particular set of lexical
or syntactic elements:
1. elements expressing referential identity or dependence, such as
pronouns and other forms of anaphora;
2. substitution, as with one(s), so and do so
3. ellipsis, including nominal ellipsis (e.g., “the best hat” → “the
best”), verb phrase ellipsis, and clausal ellipsis;
4. lexical cohesion, as in the reiteration of the same word, or a syn-
onym or near synonym, or a superordinate term or generic word;
5. conjunction, as expressed through coordinating and subordinat-
ing clausal conjunctions, adverbials like later on, and preposi-
tional phrases like in that case.
The fifth is the source of discourse relations in Halliday and Hasan
(1976) and is, in fact, the sole source. That is, discourse relations arise
from identifying what other part of the discourse the interpretation of
a conjunctive element depends on. It should be clear that cohesion as a
source of discourse relations is essentially anaphoric dependency, with
three interesting features. First, there is no theoretical constraint on its
locality, since any part of a text can theoretically depend on any other
part. Secondly, there are no constraints on how many parts of the text a
given part may depend on: in the analysis given in Halliday and Hasan
(1976, Ch. 8.3), multiple cohesive links between the parts of a sentence
3The fact that respectively can be paraphrased with the demonstrative that —
ie, “in that order” — provides additional evidence for this conclusion.
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(including the sentence as a whole) and the previous discourse are the
norm, rather than the exception. Thirdly, there are no constraints on
what parts of a discourse can be linked together, so cohesive links are
as likely to cross one another as to be embedded.
Note that Halliday and Hasan explicitly reject any notion of struc-
ture or constituency in discourse, saying for example:
Whatever relation there is among the parts of a text — the sentences,
the paragraphs, or turns in a dialogue — it is not the same as structure
in the usual sense, the relation which links the parts of a sentence or
a clause. (Halliday and Hasan, 1976, 6)
We doubt whether one can demonstrate generalized structural relations
into which sentences enter as the realisation of functions in some higher
unit as can be done for all units below the sentence. (Halliday and
Hasan, 1976, 10)
Between sentences, there are no structural relations. (Halliday and
Hasan, 1976, 27)
Thus, only the notion of anaphoric dependency is needed in describing
the source of discourse relations in Halliday and Hasan (1976): neither
constituency nor scope plays any role.
1.4 Constituency as a Source of Discourse Relations
In contrast with Halliday and Hasan (1976), both Mann and Thomp-
son’s Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) and Polanyi’s Linguistic Dis-
course Model (LDM) take constituency as the sole basis for discourse re-
lations. Both provide an exhaustive top-down context-free constituency
analysis of a text, associating with many (LDM) or all (RST) con-
stituents, a formal pragmatic account in terms of discourse relations.
Differences between the two lie in what they take to be a constituent
and how the associate discourse relations with constituents.
1.4.1 Rhetorical Structure Theory
In RST (Mann and Thompson, 1988), the constituency structure of a
discourse consists of instantiated schemas which specify discourse rela-
tions (called here rhetorical relations) between adjacent spans, which
may be clauses or the projection of instantiated schemas. The set of
schemas essentially defines a context-free (CF) grammar on a single
non-terminal, which we can call D. RST has five kinds of schemas,
which differ with respect to how they re-write D in terms of (i) rhetor-
ical relations that hold between right-hand side (RHS) sisters; (ii)
whether or not the RHS has a head (called in RST, a nucleus); and
(iii) whether there are two, three, or arbitrarily many sisters (the latter
September 3, 2006
8 / Bonnie Webber
like Kleene plus).
The first is a headed binary-branching schema in which a specific
rhetorical relation such as circumstance or evidence holds between
the head daughter and its sister (called a satellite). As the order of
the daughters doesn’t matter, such a schema actually stands for two
standard CF rules. This type of schema is illustrated in Figures 1(a)
and 2(a), where the former follows the conventions used in Mann and
Thompson (1988), and the latter follows more standard tree-drawing
conventions. RST also allows for an N-ary version of this schema, which
retains a single head daughter, but with multiple sisters, all of which
bear the same rhetorical relation with the head.
The second is a headed binary-branching schema in which the rhetor-
ical relation contrast holds between two daughters of equal headed-
ness. This schema is illustrated in Figures 1(b) and 2(b), where again,
the former follows the graphic conventions used in Mann and Thompson
(1988), and the latter follows more standard tree-drawing conventions.
The third is an N-ary branching schema called joint, in which no
rhetorical relation is taken to hold between sisters that nevertheless
belong together in some way, and all sisters are equal in headedness.
The fourth is a ternary-branching schema in which the head has a
motivation relation to one sister and a enablement relation to the
other. As in the first type of schema, the order of the daughters doesn’t
matter, so that this schema actually stands for six standard CF rules,
each corresponding to a different order of the three sisters. This schema
is illustrated in Figures 1(d) and 2(d).
The final type of schema is a multi-headed N-ary branching rule in
which each sister except the first is related to its left-adjacent sister by
a sequence relation. This is illustrated in Figures 1(e) and 2(e). Since
one’s choice of schema commits one to a particular discourse relation (or
none) holding between sisters, there is no way to say that two adjacent
spans in a discourse are related, without saying what the relation is.
This is one way that RST differs from the Linguistic Data Model, to
be discussed next.
An RST analysis of a discourse is a tree whose root non-terminal
covers the entire string span and where adjacent non-terminals in any
cut across the tree cover adjacent string spans. A possible RST anal-
ysis of the short discourse in Example 7 is shown in Figure 3, with
Figure (3a) following RST conventions and Figure (3b) following more
standard tree-drawing conventions.
(7) a. You should come visit.
b. Edinburgh is lovely in early fall
c. and there are no rabbits around.
Accounting for Discourse Relations: Constituency and Dependency / 9
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purpose
(a) (c)(b)
contrast
motivation enablement
(d) (e)
sequencesequence
FIGURE 1 RST schema types in RST notation
(a)
purpose
sequence sequence
(e)
contrast
(b) (c)
motivation enablement
(d)
FIGURE 2 RST schema types in standard tree notation
motivation
visit
visit
no rabbitslovely(a)
D
D
motivation D
D D
lovely no rabbits
(b)
FIGURE 3 RST analysis of Example 7
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Much of Mann and Thompson (1988) is concerned with delineating
the conditions under which it is appropriate for someone analysing a
discourse to assert that a particular relation holds between adjacent
spans, which then determines what schema applies. Such conditions
can be placed on (1) the informational content of the spans themselves,
(2) the speaker’s perceived intent with respect to each span and its role
with respect to its sister(s), and (3) the intended effect of the span. RST
requires an analyst to produce a single RST analysis of a discourse, so
judgments must be made in cases of perceived ambiguity and in cases
where more than one rhetorical relation can simultaneously be taken
to hold between sisters.
What RST does not do is place conditions on anything elsewhere
in the discourse. Thus it views discourse relations solely in terms of
context-free constituency. They can hold only between sisters on the
RHS of some schema, although those sisters may correspond to ei-
ther terminal nodes or the non-terminal nodes of instantiated RST
schema. (This latter point will become relevant in comparing RST and
the GraphBank approach presented in Section 1.5.2.)
1.4.2 Linguistic Discourse Model (LDM)
The Linguistic Discourse Model (Polanyi, 1988, Polanyi and van den
Berg, 1996, Polanyi et al., 2004) is a theory of discourse and discourse
parsing that resembles RST in constructing an explicit tree-structured
representation of discourse constituents, but differs in separating dis-
course structure from discourse interpretation. It does this by having
three (and only three) context-free re-write rules, each associated with
a rule for semantic composition:
1. an N-ary branching rule for discourse coordination, in which all
the RHS sisters bear the same relationship to their common par-
ent (used for elements of lists and narratives). Here there is no
specific relation between sisters. The interpretation of the parent
node is the information common to all its daughters.
2. a binary branching rule for discourse subordination, in which one
sister (considered subordinate) elaborates an entity or situation
described in the other (considered dominant). Here, elabora-
tion is the discourse relation between the sisters, and the inter-
pretation of the parent node is the interpretation of the dominant
daughter.
3. an N-ary branching rule in which the RHS sisters are related by a
logical or rhetorical relation, or by a genre-based or interactional
convention. Here, the interpretation of the parent node derives
Accounting for Discourse Relations: Constituency and Dependency / 11
September 3,
from the interpretation of each daughter and from the relation-
ship between them. Evidence for that relationship can come from
lexical and/or syntactic information. It appears that this rule
could apply without the particular relationship being fully spec-
ified, awaiting further specification later on. Such a move would
not be possible in RST.
Recent work on the LDM has been concerned with the issue of auto-
matically parsing discourse efficiently, with respect to the model. But
the issue of concern here — whether the source of discourse relations
in the LDM is constituency or dependency — comes down firmly for
the former.
1.5 Mixed Approaches to Discourse Relations
In contrast with the theories presented earlier, both D-LTAG (Webber
et al., 2003) and the theory underlying GraphBank (Wolf and Gibson,
2005) exploit both constituency and anaphoric dependency in their ac-
counts of discourse relations, but in very different ways.
1.5.1 A Lexicalized TAG for Discourse (D-LTAG)
D-LTAG is a lexicalized approach to discourse relations (Webber et al.,
2001, Forbes et al., 2003, Webber et al., 2003, Webber, 2004, Forbes-
Riley et al., 2006). Lexicalization means that D-LTAG provides an ac-
count of how lexical elements (including some phrases) anchor discourse
relations and how other parts of the text provide arguments for those
relations.
D-LTAG arose from a belief that the mechanisms for conveying dis-
course relations were unlikely to be entirely different from those for con-
veying relations within the clause. Because the latter can be anchored
on lexical items, D-LTAG was developed as a lexicalized grammar for
discourse — in particular, a lexicalized Tree Adjoining Grammar (Sch-
abes, 1990). A lexicalized TAG (LTAG) differs from a basic TAG in
taking each lexical entry to be associated with the set of tree struc-
tures that specify its local syntactic configurations. These structures
can be combined via either substitution or TAG’s adjoining operation,
in order to produce a complete sentential analysis. In D-LTAG, ele-
mentary trees are anchored (by and large) by discourse connectives
(representing predicates), whose substitution sites (arguments) can be
filled by clauses or other trees.
Elementary trees anchored by a structural connective (ie, a coordi-
nating or subordinating conjunction, a subordinator such as in order
to, so that, etc.), or what we call an empty connective are used to build
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constituent structure. The compositional interpretation of this struc-
ture is in terms of discourse relations between arguments (Forbes-Riley
et al., 2006). Discourse adverbials, on the other hand, exploit anaphoric
dependency to convey a discourse relation between the abstract object
(AO) interpretation of its matrix clause and the AO interpretation of a
previous clause, sequence of clauses, or nominalization in the discourse.
That discourse adverbials such as instead, afterwards, as a result, etc.
differ from structural connectives in terms of the distribution of their
arguments is demonstrated on theoretical grounds in Webber et al.
(2003) and on empirical grounds in Creswell et al. (2002). An expla-
nation for the anaphoric character of discourse adverbials is given in
Forbes (2003) and Forbes-Riley et al. (2006).
Both constituency and dependency can be seen in the D-LTAG anal-
ysis of Example 8:
(8) John loves Barolo.
So he ordered three cases of the ’97.
But he had to cancel the order
because he then discovered he was broke.
The analysis is shown in Figure 4. It involves a set of elementary trees
for the connectives (so, but, because, then) and a set of leaves (T 1-
T 4) corresponding to the four clauses in Example 8, minus the connec-
tives. Through the operations of substitution (solid lines) and adjoining
(dashed lines) recorded in the derivation tree (here shown to the right
of the arrow), a derived tree is produced (here shown at the head of
the arrow). More detail on both the representation of connectives and
D-LTAG derivations is given in Webber et al. (2003). A preliminary
parser for D-LTAG is described in Forbes et al. (2003).
Compositional interpretation of the derivation tree produces the dis-
course relations associated with because, so and but, while anaphor
resolution produces the other argument to the discourse relation as-
sociated with then (ie, the ordering event), just as it would if then
were paraphrased as soon after that, with the pronoun that resolved
anaphorically. Details on D-LTAG’s syntactic-semantic interface are
given in Forbes-Riley et al. (2006), along with a detailed discussion of
discourse adverbials and the various sources of their anaphoric links
with the previous discourse. Empirical data on the predicate-argument
structure of discourse connectives are now available in Release 1.0 of
the annotated Penn Discourse TreeBank4 (Dinesh et al., 2005, Milt-
sakaki et al., 2004a,b, Prasad et al., 2004, Webber, 2005). An early
effort to use data in the PDTB to develop a procedure for resolving the
4http://www.seas.upenn.edu/˜pdtb
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*
love order cancel
love order
cancel discover
α: so
so
β:then
*
then
because
α: because_midβ: but
α: so
β: but
α: because_mid
β:then
but
so
T1 T2 T3
T4
but
because
then
31
0
3
1 3
0
T1 T2
T3 T4
T4
T1 T2
T3
FIGURE 4 Derivation of Example 8
sequence manner
FIGURE 5 Simple multi-parent structure
anaphoric argument of the discourse adverbial instead is described in
Miltsakaki et al. (2003), and the effect of Information Structure on the
preferred argument of the discourse adverbial otherwise is described in
Kruijff-Korbayova´ and Webber (2001).
One final note: although D-LTAG produces only trees, it is acknowl-
edged in Webber et al. (2003) — as noted earlier by Bateman (1999)
and Gardent (1997) — that a discourse unit must be allowed to par-
ticipate in one constituent structure with left-adjacent material and
another with right-adjacent material, as in Figure 5. While RST han-
dles this as a special schema (cf. Figures 1(d) and 2(d)), D-LTAG would
have to incorporate such structures in a more general way.
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1.5.2 Wolf and Gibson (2005)
Wolf and Gibson (2005) present a view of discourse related to RST (Sec-
tion 1.4.1), but different in one important way: Rather than analyzing a
text as a recursive structure of discourse spans with discourse relations
holding between sisters, Wolf and Gibson (2005) claim that discourse
structure should be seen as a relatively shallow graph of discourse seg-
ments linked to one or more previous adjacent or non-adjacent segments
(or segment groupings, see below) via discourse relations (here called
coherence relations).
More specifically, Wolf and Gibson (2005) assume two types of basic
discourse segments: clauses and attributions. The latter are related to
what Huddleston and Pullum (2002) call reporting frames (e.g., “John
asserted that . . . ”). Clause fragments are also treated as discourse seg-
ments if they result from the interruption of a clause by a discourse
segment such as the reporting frame in (9).
(9) The economy,
according to some analysts,
is expected to improve by early next year. (Wolf and Gibson,
2005, 255, Ex. 17).
In this case, the non-adjacent clausal fragments are linked into a dis-
course segment through a coherence relation called same. (same is
never used inter-sententially though to form a segment from two non-
adjacent segments.)
While Wolf and Gibson make use of eleven broad classes of bi-
nary relations in their analysis, including same, condition, attri-
bution, cause-effect, contrast, elaboration, and generaliza-
tion, they do not require a relation to hold between the entire content
of the segments so linked together. For example, in (10)
(10) a. Difficulties have arisen in enacting the accord for the indepen-
dence of Namibia
b. for which SWAPO has fought for many years. (Wolf and Gib-
son, 2005, Ex. 18)
an elaboration relation is taken to hold between the non-restrictive
relative clause that constitutes (10b) and the matrix clause (10a), even
though (10b) only elaborates an NP within (10a) — ie, “the indepen-
dence of Namibia”. This is significant because it means that the NP
does not have to be analysed as a separate discourse segment, as would
then the remainder of the matrix clause.
The only hierarchical structuring in Wolf and Gibson’s approach
comes from grouping a sequence of adjacent discourse segments to serve
as one argument to a coherence relation whose other argument is a
Accounting for Discourse Relations: Constituency and Dependency / 15
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previous discourse segment or grouping. The basis for a grouping is
common attribution or common topic.5 Within a grouping, a coher-
ence relation can hold between segments and the same is true between
a within-grouping segment and one outside the grouping. Because a
grouping of segments on a common topic might itself contain group-
ings on common sub-topics, it appears that groupings could determine
a partial hierarchical structure for parts of a text, and that grouping is
a matter of constituency. But this is the only hierarchical structure in
Wolf and Gibson’s approach: unlike RST (Section 1.4.1) and the LDM
(Section 1.4.2), the existence of a coherence relation between two seg-
ments does not produce a new segment that can serve as argument to
another coherence relation.
Procedurally, a text is analyzed in a sequence of left-to-right passes.
First, the text is segmented in a left-to-right pass, then groupings are
generated, and finally, the possibility of a coherence relation is assessed
between each segment or grouping and each discourse segment or group-
ing to its left. This produces a rather flat discourse structure, with
frequent crossing arcs and nodes with multiple parents that Wolf and
Gibson argue should be represented as a chain graph — that is, a
graph with both directed and undirected edges, whose nodes can be
partitioned into subsets within which all edges are undirected and be-
tween which, edges are directed but with no directed cycles.6 This is
illustrated in the discourse structure ascribed to Example 11, shown in
Figure 6.
(11) 1. “The administration should now state
2. that
3. if the February election is voided by the Sandinistas
4. they should call for military aid,”
5. said former Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams.
6. “In these circumstances, I think they’d win.” (Wolf and Gibson,
2005, Ex. 26)
Figure 6 contains two groupings — one from segments 3 and 4, the
other from segments 1 and 2 and the first grouping, while among the
coherence relations are ones that hold within a grouping (cond) and
between a segment and a grouping (attribution). The approach has
been used to analyze a corpus of 135 news articles called the Discourse
GraphBank, available from the LDC catalogue as LDC2005T08.
Wolf and Gibson’s claim that discourse structure is best modelled as
5Documentation for the Discourse Graphbank (Wolf et al., 2003) states that a
grouping should only be assumed if otherwise truth conditions are changed.
6A Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) is a special case of a chain graph, in which
each subset contains only a single node.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
3−4
1−4
same cond attr
attr
evaluation−sattr
FIGURE 6 Coherence graph for Example 11
a chain graph, rather than a tree, shows that they associate discourse
relations with constituency structure alone. However, two things sug-
gest that anaphoric dependency plays a significant role. The first is the
extent to which the discourse relation elaboration underpins their
discourse structure, coupled with arguments by Knott et al. (2001) that
object-attribute elaboration is actually a matter of anaphora —
that is, anaphoric dependency. The second parallels the argument in
Section 1.2.2 that pairings in the respectively construction arise from
anaphoric dependency rather than constituency.
elaboration is the most common discourse relation in Wolf and
Gibson’s Discourse GraphBank, comprising 43.6% of the total. Many
instances of elaboration are claimed to hold between non-adjacent
discourse segments, such as between (12.4) and (12.2).
(12) 1. Susan wanted to buy some tomatoes
2. and she also tried to find some basil
3. because her recipe asked for these ingredients.
4. The basil would probably be quite expensive this time of year.
(Wolf and Gibson, 2005, Ex. 21)
Example (12) exemplifies object-attribute elaboration, which
Mann and Thompson (1988) take as holding when one segment presents
an object, and the related segment subsequently presents an attribute
of that object. But as in Knott et al. (2001), the claim for that relation
holding relies on the fact that the basil in (12.4) is anaphorically related
to some basil in (12.2).7
7The Discourse GraphBank also has cases of elaboration holding between adja-
cent segments. But many of these involve syntactic constructions such as a relative
clause (as in (10) above), an appositive (as in the relation between 1a and 1b in
(13) below), or an adjunct (as in the relation between grouping (2–3) and grouping
(1a–1b) in the same example).
(13) 1. 1a[Mr. Baker’s assistant for inter-American affairs,] 1b[Bernard Aronson,]
2. while maintaining
3. that the Sandinistas had also broken the cease-fire,
4. acknowledged:
5. “It’s never very clear who starts what.” (Wolf and Gibson, 2005, Ex. 23)
Accounting for Discourse Relations: Constituency and Dependency / 17
September 3,
Knott et al. (2001) came to their view of object-attribute elab-
oration as anaphoric dependency in trying to automatically generate
passages of text similar to that found in actual museum guidebooks.
They first analysed such passages in terms of RST, adhering to RST’s
assumption that the spans linked by a relation must either be adjacent
or if not adjacent, that any intervening spans must also be linked to the
initial span by the same relation (cf. Section 1.4.1). But they found that
in passages such as (14), they had to analyse non-adjacent segments as
standing in an elaboration relation, here (14.4) elaborating (14.2).
(14) (1) In the women’s quarters the business of running the household
took place. (2) Much of the furniture was made up of chests ar-
ranged vertically in matching pairs (. . . ). (3) Female guests were
entertained in these rooms, which often had beautifully crafted
wooden toilet boxes with fold-away mirrors and sewing boxes,
and folding screens, painted with birds and flowers.
(4) Chests were used for the storage of clothes . . . .
This, however, violated RST’s adjacency assumption. In analysing all
the cases where they saw elaboration relations holding between non-
adjacent segments, they noticed that in each case, the elaborating seg-
ment re-introduced and described an entity that had been mentioned
earlier in the discourse.8 Subsequent segments then continued that de-
scription until another previously mentioned entity was re-introduced
and elaborated.
To explain this, Knott et al. (2001) assumed that discourse was lo-
cally structured as an entity chain — ie,
a sequence of Rhetorical Structure (RS) trees, each constructed just as
in RST, but minus the elaboration relation. These trees can either
be simple trees consisting of just one text span, or more complex trees
with several layers of hierarchy. In each case, we can define the top
nucleus of the tree to be the leaf-level text span which is reached by
following the chain of nuclei from its root. A legal entity chain whose
focus is entity E is one where the top nucleus of each tree is a fact
about E.
and globally structured as a sequence of entity chains, as in Figure 7,
where the focussed entity in each chain is mentioned in a proposition
somewhere within the previous N chains. For the current discussion,
the most important thing to notice is that the links between entity
chains are based on anaphoric relations, and that such links can and
8The entity could have been introduced by one or more noun phrases, or by one
or more clauses. In the latter case, reference was via a demonstrative pronoun (this
or that) or definite or demonstrative NP.
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EC1 EC2 EC3 EC4
FIGURE 7 A legal sequence of entity-chains (Knott et al., 2001, Fig. 4)
will cross (Figure 7).
As noted, the Discourse GraphBank contains many instances of
elaboration, many holding between non-adjacent segments (includ-
ing ones at a considerable distance apart), as in the following example
from file 62 (segment numbering as in the source file):
(15) 0 First lady Nancy Reagan was saluted Monday night for her
sense of style and her contribution to the American fashion in-
dustry.
1 Mrs. Reagan was presented with a Lifetime Achievement Award
by the Council of Fashion Designers of America at its eighth an-
nual awards ceremony,
. . .
46 Also among those recognized at the ceremony was designer
Geoffrey Beene,
47 who was saluted for making “fashion as art.”
. . .
48 Performer Liza Minelli,
49 one of many women attending the ceremony who dressed in
Mrs. Reagan’s favorite color,
. . .
54 Actress Audrey Hepburn,
55 wearing a red gown designed by Givenchy,
56 presented a Lifetime Achievement Award to photographer
Richard Avedon,
. . .
Here annotators have recorded elaboration relations between seg-
ment 46 and segment 1, between segment 48 and segment 1, between
segment 54 and segment 1, and between several later segments and seg-
ment 1. But each of these appears to be based on an anaphoric bridging
relation between the people mentioned in segments 46, 48, 54 and else-
where, and the attendees at the awards ceremony mentioned in segment
1. (Recall that Wolf and Gibson do not require a relation to hold be-
tween the entire contents of linked segments, as in Example 10.) Other
anaphoric relations are discernable in other instances of elaboration.
Thus what is being captured here by Wolf and Gibson is a discourse
relation based on anaphoric dependency rather than constituency.
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77 78 7976 attrib attrib
claimed provoked said unarmed
(a) (b)
76 77 78 79
contr contr
attrib attrib
claimed provoked said unarmed
contr
FIGURE 8 Coherence graph for Example 16
A second such case can be found in constructions that resemble
respectively at the discourse level, as in Example 16 taken from file
105 of the Discourse GraphBank (segment numbering as in the source
file), which has been annotated with the discourse relations shown in
Figure 8(a).
(16) 76 Washington claimed
77 the downings were provoked by aggressive and threatening ac-
tions by armed Libyan aircraft,
78 while Libya said
79 its jets were unarmed and on a reconaissance flight over inter-
national waters.
If from the perspective of constituency, this were analysed as the sim-
pler structure in Figure 8(b), then as with the respectively construction,
the individual pairings would be a matter of anaphoric dependency,
derived only when appropriate. While such examples might not occur
frequently in discourse, the respectively construction shows there are
alternative explanations for crossing dependencies that don’t involve
arbitrary inter-leaving of constituency structure. And once instances of
discourse relations are understood to arise from anaphoric dependency,
it calls into question Wolf and Gibson’s leap upward in complexity from
trees to chain graphs as a model for discourse structure.
1.6 Conclusion
I started this paper by mentioning Ron’s advice that one should seek
to identify the minimal machinery required for a task. Here, the task
was to understand and compare the source of discourse relations in five
different theories: Halliday and Hasan’s theory of discourse cohesion,
Mann and Thompson’s Rhetorical Structure Theory, Polanyi’s Linguis-
tic Data Model, Wolf and Gibson’s theory of discourse graphs, and the
lexically-based theory that I’ve been involved in, D-LTAG. What I have
tried to show is that the paired notions of constituency and dependency
provide a useful way of understanding some of the significant similari-
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ties and differences between these theories. If I have succeeded, I may
also have convinced the reader that they are equally important in un-
derstanding discourse relations.
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